🔍 Read the full analysis: How Field, Factory, And Office Jobs Fit Into The Economy on ThorstenMeyerAI.com
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TL;DR
ThorstenMeyerAI.com published the first episode of its 60-part Work After Work series on Nov. 2, 2026, using the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors to explain long-term shifts in employment. The source cites historical estimates showing farming’s share of the U.S. labor force fell from 73.7% in 1800 to 1.5% in an ILO modelled estimate for 2025; it also says services have employed more people worldwide than farming since 2001.
ThorstenMeyerAI.com published the first episode of its planned 60-part Work After Work series on Nov. 2, 2026, describing how employment has shifted from farming to factories and service work. The installment uses the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors as a framework for tracing that change and for raising questions about how automation may affect jobs.
The episode defines the primary sector as work extracting or gathering resources from nature, including farming, fishing and forestry. The secondary sector makes goods and includes manufacturing, construction and energy. The tertiary sector covers services such as trade, transport, health, education and government. The article uses bread as an example: growing wheat is primary work, milling and baking are secondary, and delivery and retail are services.
Its central historical example is the decline in farming’s share of U.S. employment. Drawing on estimates by economic historian Stanley Lebergott, the source reports that farming accounted for 73.7% of the U.S. labor force in 1800, 54.8% in 1850, 40.2% in 1900 and 12.0% in 1950. It also cites an International Labour Organization modelled estimate that farming represented 1.5% in 2025. These figures refer to shares of employment, not the amount of food produced.
The article says the shift also took place in other countries, at different speeds. It reports that China’s primary-sector employment share fell from 83.5% in 1952 to 22.2% in 2024, while Japan’s fell from 53.8% in 1920 to 3.2% in 2020. It further says the ILO’s modelled estimates place 2001 as the year services began employing more people worldwide than farming.
Where Workers Have Moved
The sector framework helps explain a major change in how economies employ people: fewer workers are needed directly in agriculture, while manufacturing and services account for larger portions of employment. That shift matters to readers because it shapes what kinds of jobs are available, where workers may need to retrain, and how changes in technology can affect households and communities.
The source also challenges the claim that the United States no longer makes goods. It says U.S. factory employment is about 35% below its June 1979 peak, while real manufacturing output in 2025 was about 1.9 times its 1979 level. The comparison shows why job counts and production are different measures: fewer factory workers do not, by themselves, mean less manufacturing output.
The article’s discussion of automation is framed as a question for the series rather than an established forecast. It presents as the author’s thesis the possibility that automation could become a sector of its own and perform up to 90% of work within a decade or a few decades. That projection is not presented as a confirmed finding, and the source says a later episode will examine it.
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How the Three-Sector Map Emerged
The three-part classification is a relatively recent economic framework, not a timeless description. The source credits New Zealand economist Allan G. B. Fisher with introducing the term “tertiary” in a book written in 1934 and published in 1935. Fisher later described employment moving from primary activities into secondary and, to a greater extent, tertiary production.
Economist Colin Clark compared employment patterns across countries in his 1940 book The Conditions of Economic Progress. He described movement from agriculture to manufacturing and then to commerce and services, and observed that industry’s share of employment did not rise indefinitely. French economist Jean Fourastié argued in 1949 that services could take in workers displaced as technology increased productivity elsewhere.
The categories are useful but not exact. The source notes that a software engineer employed by a carmaker may be classified as a manufacturing worker in one statistical system and a service worker in another. Mining also falls into different categories depending on the system. Comparisons across places or periods therefore depend partly on how industries are defined and counted.
“My thesis, not a fact: within a decade or a few decades, automation could become a sector of its own, doing up to 90% of the work with no human hand.”
— Thorsten Meyer, author of the series
Limits of the Employment Figures
The figures in the source come from different historical series and statistical systems. The excerpt identifies Lebergott’s U.S. estimates and describes the ILO’s 2025 figure as modelled, but it does not provide the underlying tables or explain all differences in definitions, such as which workers and industries are included. The China and Japan figures are also drawn from separate national or historical series, so they should not be treated as perfectly uniform measures.
The episode’s broad categories cannot show every change in work within a sector. They do not, on their own, describe wages, job quality, hours worked or how much of a worker’s role is automated. The source also offers no evidence establishing its up-to-90% automation thesis; its time horizon is broad, and the meaning of “work” in that claim is not specified in the supplied material.
The Series Turns to Automation
Work After Work is described as a daily series of 60 episodes about how economies are built, how work has shifted and which tasks may remain human as machines take on more. The first installment introduces the three-sector framework as a starting point for later discussions, including the effects of mechanization and automation.
The source says Episode 48 will put Meyer’s automation thesis on trial. It does not give a publication date for that episode or provide details about the evidence it will examine. Until then, the 90% figure should be read as the author’s stated thesis, not as a confirmed forecast.
Key Questions
What are the three economic sectors?
The primary sector gathers resources from nature, the secondary sector makes goods, and the tertiary sector provides services. The article gives farming, manufacturing and retail as examples.
How much of the U.S. labor force worked in farming in 1800?
The source cites Stanley Lebergott’s estimate that farming accounted for 73.7% of the U.S. labor force in 1800. It compares that with an ILO modelled estimate of 1.5% for 2025; the figures concern employment shares.
Does the decline in factory jobs mean the United States makes less?
Not necessarily. The source says U.S. factory employment was about 35% below its June 1979 peak, while real manufacturing output in 2025 was about 1.9 times its 1979 level. Employment and output measure different things.
Is the claim that automation could do 90% of work an established forecast?
No. The source labels it the author’s thesis, not a fact. It does not specify a precise time horizon beyond “a decade or a few decades” or define how the share of work would be measured.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
